

UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBER	
AD509285	
CLASSIFICATION CHANGES	
TO:	unclassified
FROM:	confidential
LIMITATION CHANGES	
TO:	Approved for public release, distribution unlimited
FROM:	Controlling DoD Organization. Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development [Army], Washington, DC 20310.
AUTHORITY	
AGO D/A ltr, 9 May 1975; AGO D/A ltr, 9 May 1975	

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

**UNCLASSIFIED**

**AD.** 509285

**CLASSIFICATION CHANGED  
TO: UNCLASSIFIED  
FROM: CONFIDENTIAL  
AUTHORITY.**

\_\_\_\_\_ *AGC, D/A*

\_\_\_\_\_ *ltw.*

*9 May 75*

**UNCLASSIFIED**

Best Available Copy

(18) OACSFOR

(17) OT-UT-701198

UNCLASSIFIED;



CONFIDENTIAL  
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

ACDA (M) (26 May 70)

FOR OT UT 701198

1 June 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report, Lessons Learned, Headquarters, US Army  
Support Command, Saigon, Period Ending 31 January 1970 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

AD509285

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Information of actions initiated as a result of subject report should be forwarded to ACSFOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*Kenneth G. Wickham*

KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General

1 Incl  
as

DISTRIBUTION:

Commanding Generals  
US Continental Army Command  
US Army Combat Developments Command  
US Army Materiel Command  
Commandants  
US Army War College  
US Army Command and General Staff College  
US Army Ordnance School  
US Army Quartermaster School  
US Army Transportation School

Copies furnished:

Office, Chief of Staff, US Army  
Deputy Chiefs of Staff  
Chief of Research and Development  
Assistant Chiefs of Staff  
Chief of Engineers

Regraded unclassified when separated  
from classified inclosure.

UNCLASSIFIED;

CONFIDENTIAL

20050315104

003 65



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, SAIGON  
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96491

AVCA SGN GO S

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, US Army Support Command,  
Saigon, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA CO-MH  
APO 96384

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development (ACSFOR),  
Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities. a. (U) Command:  
Colonel William Stendebach, Jr. replaced Colonel Louis Rachmeler as  
Deputy Commander in December and Colonel W.D. Wary joined the command  
as Chief of Staff the same month. The former Chief of Staff, Colonel  
E.A. Hinojosa, Jr. departed for CONUS in November.

b. (C) Personnel, Administration, Morale and Discipline

(1) (C) The command strength on 31 October 1969 was 832 officers,  
249 warrant officers and 15,477 enlisted. At the end of the reporting  
period the command strength was 769 officers, 273 warrant officers, and  
15,091 enlisted personnel.

(2) (U) Safety The second round of Defensive Driver Instructor  
Training classes is being conducted by the Safety Division. Four  
classes were conducted on 12 and 19 December 1969 and on 17 and 23  
January 1970. Forty instructors were certified and will replace  
personnel who have rotated. Since the Defensive Driving Program was  
initiated in July 1969, 198 instructors have been trained by the SSC  
Safety Office. These people have the mission of teaching the three  
hour course to all Support Command licensed drivers.

(3) (U) Chaplain (a) An increase in attendance and number of  
weekly services was noted during the month of November. Thanksgiving  
services were held in chapels throughout the command. Unit support of  
these services was commendable, which contributed to the success of  
Thanksgiving chapel activities. Unit Chaplains joined with unit  
commanders at Dinner tables all over the command to say Grace and spread

FOR OT UT

701198

Inclosure

1

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

# CONFIDENTIAL

AFSA 100 100 0

SUBJECT: Operation Report - Lessons Learned. US Army Support Command,  
Saigon, Period Ending 31 January 1970, AFSA 100-60 100 0

the word of Thanksgiving, another way of our chaplains praying for  
God and God to men.

(b) Chaplains were extremely active in civic action projects during the months of November, December and January. Many of these included building of an Elementary School near Tan Son Nhut. A dedication ceremony was held on 18 November 1969. This was attended by 40 per cent of the 64th Quartermaster Battalion who helped build the school. Gifts were made to orphanages at Bien Hoa, Ho Kai, Binh Long, and to the Self Made School at Lai Thieu. Many packages of cookies, candies, and clothing were distributed to orphanages and hospitals. Many missionaries were also assisted in their work. Chaplains in the Tung Tam area assisted with the Boy Scout Jamboree.

c. (C) Operations (1) (U) Operation KEYSTONE CARDINAL was conducted during the past quarter with the departure of the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division from Bien Hoa AFB.

(2) (U) The departure of the Philippine Civic Action Group from Vietnam required personnel from USASUPCOM, SGN and its subordinate units to establish facilities at Tay Ninh to process residual equipment returned to US Forces.

(3) (C) Operation KEYSTONE BLUEJAY was initiated during the past quarter. USASUPCOM, SGN is responsible for all logistical actions required to redeploy those units located in III and IV CTZ's which are part of the Presidential third reduction in force package. In order to perform this function personnel from this headquarters and its subordinate units have established facilities at Di An and Long Binh to receive equipment of redeploying/inactivating units; the 1st Infantry Division is the major unit involved.

d. (U) Organization (Inclosure 2)

e. (U) Logistics (1) Maintenance (a) Throughout the period, several extensive studies were made of the 12 Ton S&F trailer maintenance problem with specific attempts made to resolve the landing leg problems. A trip was made to Cam Ranh Bay to obtain tubing to fabricate a field fix pending receipt of newly designed landing legs. In addition, a complete survey of all trailers was conducted to insure the presence of safety considered essential for eliminating or reducing causes of accidents. On-the-spot deadline removed a defective

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

REF: COM GO S

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, US Army Support Command  
Saigon, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCM CS702-65 (X) (U)

number of trailers from the road and a continued program has upgraded the entire trailer fleet. Limited supply of the new legs continues to hamper progress.

(b) In an effort to upgrade the maintenance posture of Material Handling Equipment, a Roadside Spot Check for MHE was initiated and has been partially successful. A spot check team has been sent to work sites to evaluate operator performance of maintenance with the results sent back through command channels. After each unit commander is apprised of his MHE maintenance posture, he then can take aggressive action to insure proper maintenance is performed.

(c) Due to increased activity in retrograde areas and a continued shortage of repairable assemblies, the 79th Maint Bn was released from the mission to perform top overhaul on M-113 engines. Late in November the 1/4 ton major assembly rebuild & overhaul program was closed with all unserviceable assemblies to be shipped to Vinnell Corp repair facility at Cam Ranh Bay.

(d) A revitalized program for support in the Delta was initiated during the last reporting period and during this period has graphically borne fruit. As service to units handicapped by limited transportation in the Delta, a maintenance collecting point was established to facilitate turn-in of unserviceable equipment in the local area. The maintenance unit has assumed the responsibility for returning this equipment to the established evacuation points with an attempted consolidation of transportation requirements, which considerably eased the burden on customers throughout the Delta.

(e) Retrograde of material has played a most significant part in activities during the reporting period. Maintenance personnel were stationed at the equipment processing locations during Keystone Cardinal, which was completed during the middle of December. After action reports were barely out of the typewriter when planning was in full swing for KEYSTONE BLUEJAY, initiated during this period. As in previous Keystone exercises, maintenance personnel were situated at the equipment turn-in location to insure a smooth transition of equipment from the using unit to retrograde personnel. Because of the magnitude of this operation, a separate directorate was established with all maintenance personnel associated with Retrograde and Closed Loop activities being physically transferred to the ACofS Retrograde in early January (see paragraph 1e(4)). Close cooperation and mutual assistance continues to be the order of the day. This entire retrograde operation has presented some difficulties which were resolved as they arose. Water blasters to properly cleanse the equipment to meet Department of Agriculture standards, establishment of collecting points for ease of turn-in, security of the equipment while

# CONFIDENTIAL

AVCA GEN CO 3

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, US Army Support Command, Saigon, Period Ending 31 January 1970, AUSA COFOR-65 (R2) (U)

in retrograde locations and numerous other individual problems have been addressed with varying degrees of success.

(1) Effective 1 January 1970, Saigon Support Command assumed the responsibility for monitoring three more contracts formerly managed by 1st Logistical Command. One of these contracts (Centralized Commercial Vehicle Parts Warehouse Contract) has become the prime responsibility of this section and included assignment of the individual contracting officer representative. Transition of this responsibility has been extremely smooth and trouble free. The authorization to accept staff responsibility for Vietnam-wide contract performance required by one of these contracts remains to be resolved.

## (2) Supply

(a) During the months of November, December and January 1970, the Subsistence Section placed special emphasis on the issue of Thanksgiving and Christmas holiday menu items. The printed menu cards were also delivered and issued for both holiday periods. In addition to the normal issue of subsistence items, the Class I activities were called upon to issue Christmas trees donated by Pan American Airlines and by citizens of the States of California and Washington. Red Cross personnel utilized our Class I facilities to distribute "ditty bags" to all military and civilian personnel on the basis of one per individual.

(b) USAV, Det #2, Vung Tau has deprocessed and issued all Kenner Ski barges. As of 9 January 1970, USAV, Det #2, Vung Tau had twenty (20) Boston whalers and 120 40 H-P Johnson motors on hand. Disposition instructions have been received from USAV for the twenty (20) Boston whalers and fifty-six (56) motors. USAV is preparing disposition instructions on the remaining sixty-four (64) motors.

(c) During the fall of 1969, all ASYSTONE CARDINAL equipment was accepted, inspected and reported. This involved close coordination between the personnel at the Phu Loi receiving area, the personnel at the 79th Maintenance Battalion, the personnel at the 147th Light Maintenance Company, and higher headquarters. Thousands of Federal Stock Numbers in almost every material category were processed which involved tens of thousands of items of equipment. The disposition of equipment called for redistribution to units (both U.S. and Free World Forces), return to depot stock, retrograde, salvage, and out-of-country distribution. This project may be considered complete except for certain pieces of equipment on which disposition has not yet been received and for final reports.

## (3) Petroleum

# CONFIDENTIAL

AFCA SON GO S

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, US Army Support Command,  
Saigon, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCM COMOR-65 (RC) (U)

(a) A plan has been approved to provide a new Jetty on the Dong Nai River for Y-tankers and POL barges to be off loaded and to provide security lighting for the Jetty. Although the Jetty has been designed, the location of the Jetty has not been determined because present plans call for the construction of the Jetty to parallel the old Jetty. This command desires a location closer to the pumping station. A hydrographic study of the Dong Nai River is being conducted to determine feasibility of relocating the Jetty from the present planned site. The project includes a T-type Jetty with 10 dolphins allowing berth of 2 Y-tankers simultaneously. There will be 3 six-inch fuel lines extending from the Jetty to the pumping station. Security lighting will be provided for the Jetty and pumping station. RMC has been contracted for construction of the Jetty.

(b) Many measures have been taken during the reporting period to reduce air deliveries of POL into the Delta in support of the 14th Avn Gp and US Navy locations. Due to the extensive water system in the Delta, the use of these waterways to deliver POL to Class III locations near rivers and canals was implemented. In November two LCM boats equipped with a 10,000 gallon tank each delivered diesel fuel to Rach Soi (Pavv). Subsequent deliveries have been made to Rach Soi and Moc Hoa.

## (4) Retrograde and Disposal

(a) On 15 January 1970 the new office of the ACofS, Retrograde and Disposal became operational. LTC John L. Carr, Transportation Corps, is the OIC of this new section. ACofS, Retrograde and Disposal represents the Commanding General and exercises staff supervision over all matters pertaining to retrograde of material, closed loop support program, and property disposal.

(b) Efforts to expedite the shipment of retrograde vehicles have been initiated. These vehicles are now offered for shipment from the CC&S yard. This procedure allows TMA and 4th Trans Comd additional time to coordinate availability of vessels for shipment of Retrograde.

(c) The twice monthly 1423 Report is being mechanized. This report had previously been prepared manually and consumed many manhours. The data for this report will be extracted by data processing from transportation manifest and will result in approximately 80% decrease in manhours.

(d) The Reports Control Center of Project KEYSTONE BLUEJAY became operational on 21 January 1970 and is monitoring equipment turn-in data for the project.



# CONFIDENTIAL

AVC 500 50 5

Sub 21: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, US Army Support Command, Saigon, Period Ending 31 January 1970, HQ 500-65 (H) (J)

(e) Property Disposal at Ho-Nai has made great strides during the month of January. The warehouses, 48,000 sq.ft. each, were transferred to the Depot on 20 January 1970. Specialized equipment, such as the alligator shears and cable strippers, has received command interest. The alligator shears and cable strippers were operational as of 23 January 1970.

(f) T-Day retrograde projects at Newport for a six-lane wash rack, 181,000 sq. ft. paved and crushed rock open storage areas, and 19,200 sq. ft. roads are 85% complete. A completion date in the beginning of March is expected. One of the two LOT ramps has been re-welded and rechecked on a self-help basis and work is continuing on repair of the second ramp.

## 2. (U) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observation, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

- a. Personnel. None
- b. Intelligence. None
- c. Operations. None
- d. Organization. None
- e. Training. Training of Tech Supply Officers and Tech Supply NCOs.

(1) OBSERVATION: Tech supply officers and tech supply NCOs are not properly trained for supervision in operation of MCR 500 tech supply activities.

(2) EVALUATION: The smooth operation of MCR 500 tech supply activities is one of the keys to a successful maintenance program. The tech supply officers and NCOs that are being assigned to Saigon Support Command units are not properly trained in operation of the MCR 500 tech supply activities.

### (3) RECOMMENDATIONS:

(a) COMUS training courses should emphasize the training of tech supply officers and NCOs in operation of MCR 500 tech supplies.

(b) That only trained individuals be assigned as OICs and NCOICs of MCR 500 tech activities.

- f. Logistics.

# CONFIDENTIAL

AVCA MSG GO S

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, US Army Support Command,  
Saigon, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCF CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

## (1) Shipment of Holiday Subsistence.

(a) OBSERVATION: Subsistence menu items were delivered to all Class I Activities on time and in excellent condition during the holiday period except for several vegetable items on the Christmas menu shipped to the Can Tho area.

(b) EVALUATION: The shipment of fresh vegetables arrived late at the USADLB. This caused the Class I Activities to issue the vegetables late, but still in time for the holiday consumption period. The fresh vegetables for the Can Tho area were loaded and departed the USADLB at 0300 hours, 24 Dec 69, for the 8th Aerial Port, Bien Hoa. A flight was scheduled for 0800 hours that same morning. The flight was cancelled due to expiration of crew duty time. The flight was rescheduled for 1530 hours, 24 Dec 69, and later cancelled for a CE mission. TMA personnel did not inform this headquarters that the 1530 flight had been canceled. This was primarily due to confusion caused in the change of the day and night shifts at TMA, Food Traffic Section. The vegetables finally departed Bien Hoa at 0800 hours, 25 Dec 69. They arrived at Can Tho at 1100 hours causing supported units to receive them at approximately 1300 hours on 25 Dec 69.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That closer coordination between the Perishable Section, USADLB and Food Traffic Section, TMA, be given to future shipments to subsistence. This should be supervised closely by the Food Division, this headquarters.

## (2) Turn-In of Empty Industrial Gas Cylinders.

(a) OBSERVATION: Unless positive action is taken with regard to the turn-in of empty industrial gas cylinders, the refilling capability in Vietnam and Japan will be greatly impaired.

(b) EVALUATION: Industrial gases are issued from Long Binh Depot in the same manner as other items, which means that the turn-in of the empty cylinders is left up to the DSUs. As the empty cylinders are required by the gas producing plants both here and in Japan, the DSUs must return the cylinders to the plants on a timely basis.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: Require the units to turn-in the empty cylinders to the depot and at the same time submit a request for a like amount.

## (3) Self-Service Supply Center (SSSC).

## CONFIDENTIAL

AVCA SOG 60 5

SUBJECT: Operational report - Lessons Learned, US Army Support Command.  
Saigon, Period Ending 31 January 1970, HQS CCFM-55 (R2) (J)

(a) OBSERVATION: Implementation of the credit control system by Self-Service Centers within the Saigon Support Command has resulted in slightly improved services to the customer through a more efficient allocation of supplies. However, the system has not achieved its potential benefits as evidenced by numerous customer complaints.

(b) EVALUATION: A credit control system for controlling the allocation of these supplies is more efficient than a quantity control system. The rationing of monies is far easier than the rationing of quantities in the SSSC. Additionally, the credit control system has the advantage of forcing the customer to choose a particular mix of goods that will satisfy his requirements while remaining within the limits of a budget. It should be the goal of this system to eliminate all forms of rationing except through budget controls. Due to a general scarcity of SSSC type supplies within RVN in quantities that will cover our requirements, the SSSCs have resorted to a continuation of quantity rationing of supplies, resulting in customers complaints arising from an inequitable allocation of supplies.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that higher headquarters continue efforts to improve the in-country stock for SSSC type items, thereby allowing the relaxation of quantitative controls, i. e. elimination of shelf limits in the stores, and the requirement that the customer furnish a shopping list. Our goal should be to allow the customer to buy whatever he desires within the limits of his budget.

### (4) Title-Pending Disposition Instruction.

(a) OBSERVATION: Several CRC print outs were received back from USARV on which certain items had either not been given disposition or were in a pending status. Disposition on these items was subsequently received by USARV but there exists no firm method for disseminating this information.

(b) EVALUATION: A definite and timely method of disseminating delayed disposition instruction is necessary to insure speedy completion of disposition on Keystone items. Identification of predisposition instructions would permit rapid disposition of equipment.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That predisposition instructions be supplied to the maximum extent possible.

### (5) Transportation Roving Contact Team.

(a) OBSERVATION: When numerous small units are involved in a redeployment/deactivation and are not being processed through a central

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

AVC: SGN 00 S

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, US Army Support Command, Saigon, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CCFOR-65 (R2) (U)

processing point, many transportation problems are encountered. Coordination must be exercised through a single transportation element, to insure that units understand and comply with the transportation requirements necessary to effect shipment of property, equipment and personnel.

(b) EVALUATION: In the case of numerous small units involved in Keystone Cardinal, the complex task of coordinating the various transportation problems in those units was solved by establishing a "Transportation Roving Contact Team". The function of the Transportation Roving Contact Team is to serve as a point of central contact for redeploying/deactivating units on transportation matters.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Future planning for the redeployment/deactivation of numerous small size units at different locations should include a provision for the activation, at an early stage in preparations for movement, of a Transportation Roving Contact Team. The Roving Contact Team should remain operational throughout the movement cycle and should visit each unit at least twice during the redeployment/deactivation cycle.

### (6) Cost Reduction.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the early months of FY 70, the Saigon Support Command ammunition system required in excess of 100 barges to provide distribution of ammo through the system to US and RVNAF forces.

(b) EVALUATION: As a result of intensive management of ammunition barges at CAT LAI, thirty contractor-owned barges have been determined to be no longer required for the transportation of ammunition. This reduction of assets committed was accomplished on 1 January 1970 without reducing the total amount of tonnage transported. This action resulted in a cost savings of \$655,300.00 and has contributed significantly to the cost reduction effort.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That intensive management and analysis continue to evaluate performance of contractors' requirements with a view toward reduction of contractor obligation.

### (7) Repair & Return for M107/M110 Howitzers.

(a) OBSERVATIONS: The criticality of the M107/M110 series Howitzers requires a comprehensive and responsive maintenance program.

(b) EVALUATION: To provide an effective maintenance program for self propelled artillery, a R&R program has been established so that a direct support contact team and the gun crew work together on site to repair defective components. To date, the program has been hampered by

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

AVCA SGN GO 5

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, US Army Support Command,  
Saigon, Period Ending 31 January 1970, AOS CSFOR-05 (R2, 0)

the nonavailability and the excessive order and ship time for needed repair parts. On numerous occasions repairs were delayed or rescheduled because of a lack of key parts.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That the repair parts experience gained from the ALC7/M110 R&R program be reviewed and that a "standard" push package developed and sent to this theater on a serial number basis to support this weapon system.

### (8) Protection of Communication-Electronics and Office Machines during Transport.

(a) OBSERVATION: A recent survey reveals that approximately 10% of communication electronics and office machines turned-in to J5/G5 maintenance facilities have been damaged due to improper packing and transporting procedures.

(b) EVALUATION: When subject equipment is not properly protected during transport, unnecessary damage often occurs. The equipment then remains on deadline longer, is more costly to repair and may have its life expectancy shortened considerably. In some cases, the equipment has required out-of-country depot rebuild, or even salvage.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS:

1 Transport equipment in authorized carrying cases.

2 Where carrying cases are not authorized or on hand, padded crates should be used for shipping.

3 Equipment should be placed on shock absorbing material, such as an old mattress or discarded packing material.

4 Cover equipment to offer protection from rain and dust.

g. Communications. None

h. Material. None

## CONFIDENTIAL

AVCA Sub GO S

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, US Army Support Command,  
Saigon, Period Ending 31 January 1970, NCS GOFON-65 (R2) (U)

i. Other. None

REF: LBN 2004

2 Incl

~~1. Distinguished Visitors List~~

1. Organizational Chart

Incl 1 wd, HQ DA

*H. B. Gibson, Jr.*  
H. B. Gibson, Jr.  
Colonel, OrdC  
Commanding

AVCA GO-MH (undated) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the US Army Support Command  
Saigon for period ending 31 Jan 70 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

LA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384 10 Mar 70

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST  
APO 96384

1. (U) The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Saigon, for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 is forwarded.

2. (U) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning training of tech supply officers and tech supply NCOs, page 6, paragraph e. Concur with the recommendation that only trained supervisory personnel should be assigned to the NCR 500 Tech Supply activities. Analysis of Instruct and Advise reports from mechanized tech supply facilities has pointed out that many bottlenecks in supply operations could have been prevented by properly trained and experienced officers and NCOs. To improve this situation, this headquarters has increased I & A visits to supply units from three to four times a year. All Support Commands were requested to send all OICs and MCICs of NCR 500 facilities to the one week NCR 500 supervisory course conducted by USAHV. COMUS training courses should be developed to ensure tech supply officers and NCOs are properly trained prior to arrival in Vietnam.

b. Reference item concerning turn-in of empty gas cylinders, page 7, paragraph f(2). Concur. LC Reg 700-26, dated 2 Sep 69, para 5c(2), requires that DSUs insure that supported units return one empty gas cylinder for each cylinder requested. DSUs are to turn in all empty cylinders, regardless of serviceability criteria, to the supporting depot. Action officer at USASUPCOM, SGV has been informed of the above.

c. Reference item concerning Self Service Supply Center, page 7, paragraph f3. Concur. Customer complaints received at this headquarters primarily concern lack of supplies, not the credit control system. Quantity rationing is a management tool separate from credit control and is used only to insure that customers get a fair share of items that are temporarily in short supply. This headquarters is continuing efforts to improve the in-country stock position of all depots. Additionally, this headquarters is conducting an in-depth study of self-service supply operations to determine what changes can be made to improve SSSC supply support to 1st Logistical Command customers.

d. Reference item concerning disposition instructions for Keystone Cardinal, page 8, paragraph f(4). Concur. The situation of delayed disposition due to items held for further disposition was a problem under Keystone Cardinal. In some cases, items were held in a pending status for over 30 days.

AVCA GO-MH (undated) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the US Army Support Command  
Saigon for period ending 31 Jan 70 MCS CSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

The cause for this was an inability to obtain disposition instructions from USARPAC, and, in some cases, from DA, as these items were destined for special projects. Under Keystone Cardinal, the system for directing the ultimate disposition was accomplished by forwarding information through the reporting channels on an off-line basis. Under Keystone Bluejay, with the KB card systems, only a very few items within the communications and electronics field are held at USARV for further disposition. Without predisposition authority, a hold situation is inevitable in an exercise of this magnitude. Every effort has been made by this headquarters and HQ, USARV, to minimize these types of actions. During the planning for Keystone Bluejay, every effort was made to obtain predisposition instructions. Where possible, these were provided by USARV and placed at the SUPCOM level.

e. Reference item concerning Repair and Return for M107/M110 Howitzers, page 9, paragraph f(7). Nonconcur. Although nonavailability and excessive order and ship time may hamper the artillery program in the Saigon Support Command, significantly greater success with this program in the other support command areas indicates that this problem may be localized to some extent. Increasing the time between performing a technical inspection on a weapon and performing the R&R maintenance would allow time for receipt of more of the required repair parts. Requisitions on Red Ball expanded priority are authorized for repair parts required for R&R maintenance. Experience indicates that repair parts required for R&R maintenance are quite varied. Therefore a "standard push package" for every weapon would not be economical nor feasible as a repair parts source.

f. Reference item concerning protection of communication-electronics and office machines during transport, page 10, paragraph f(8). Concur. Physical protection for COMEL items during transport is a continuing problem. Units are continually reminded by shop personnel to use padding material. This problem is one of constant education.

3. (U) Concur with the basic report as modified by this indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LBN 4862



DONALD R. WILLIAMS  
LTC, AGC  
Deputy AG

CF:  
USASUPCOM, SGN  
DA ACSFOR



AVHGC-DST (undated) 2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, US Army Support Command,  
Saigon, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

20 MAR 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPDP-DT,  
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 from Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Saigon and concurs with the comments of indorsing headquarters.


2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "12 Ton S&P Maintenance Problem", page 2, paragraph e: concur. The problem of landing legs on the 12-ton S&P was brought to the attention of CG TACOM during his visit to USARV in February 1970. The first shipment of new landing legs arrived in USARV in December 1969. Supply of this item will be continuous but limited by current production schedules. Recommend that TACOM continue to address the problem of supply and maintenance of 12-ton S&P landing legs.

b. Reference item concerning "Repair and Return for M107/M110 Howitzers", page 9, paragraph f(7): concur with paragraph 2e, 1st Indorsement. The provisioning of a "standard" push package of repair parts for support of the heavy artillery on a serial number basis is uneconomical and impractical. Demand experience has proven to be an effective means of establishing required repair parts stockage when fully exploited. Presently there are two USARV Command Maintenance letters in the field addressing repair parts support for subject weapons. One letter provides updated PLL/ASL data and the other provides an additional listing of parts required to support the Product Improvements applied to the weapons. Subject unit will be contacted and requested to submit a listing of specific parts delaying repairs thru their Materiel Release Expediter to the ICCV. Adequate RO's are established to support the repair and return program. No additional action is required by this or higher headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Cy furn:  
1st Log Comd  
US Army Support Command Saigon

  
L. D. MURRAY  
CPT, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

GPOP-DT (Undtd) 3d Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, US Army Support Command, Saigon,  
for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CS/OR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 14 APR 1970


TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



L.M. OZAKI  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG



----- OPERATIONAL CONTROL IS RETAINED WITH PARENT UNIT.

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

## DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R &amp; D

(Security classification of title, body of abstract, and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author)		1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
HQ, OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310		CONFIDENTIAL	
2. REPORT TITLE		2b. GROUP	
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, US Army Support Command, Saigon		4	
3. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)			
Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 69 - 31 Jan 70.			
4. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)			
CO, US Army Support Command, Saigon			
5. REPORT DATE		7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES	7b. NO. OF REFS
Undated		9	
6a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.		6b. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
b. PROJECT NO. N/A		701198	
c.		9b. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)	
d.			
10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT			
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY	
N/A		OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310	
13. ABSTRACT			

17

DD FORM 1473  
1 NOV 66

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification